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The Clash of Civilizations? Statistical Evidence from Armed Conflicts, 1989-2015
Abstract
Do armed conflicts in the contemporary post-Cold War period reflect a clash of civilizations (CoC) as
predicted by Samuel Huntington? This study substantially broadens and temporally extends the scope of
major extant quantitative tests of the CoC thesis by assessing not only interactions among states but
also interactions between states and non-state armed groups, from 1989 to 2015. Based on Chi-square
and logistic regression tests, this study does not find empirical support for the CoC thesis as a basis for
adopting foreign policies of civilizational containment.
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The recent surge in suspected Islamist terror incidents in the West and America’s
temporary restriction on immigration from some largely Islamic states have revitalized
Huntington’s (1993) famous clash of civilizations prediction 25 years ago. But is the world really
experiencing a clash of civilizations (CoC) following the end of the Cold War? While a
quantitative evaluative design allows for a comprehensive test of Huntington’s CoC thesis, major
extant quantitative evaluations are temporally and substantially flawed, failing to effectively
assess the clash thesis on its own terms. Huntington’s clash thesis (1993; 1996) predicted that
ideological antipathies of the Cold War period will, in the contemporary post-Cold War period,
be supplanted by cultural conflicts, which at the broadest level are civilizational conflicts.
Conflicts of contemporary global politics will mainly be between nation-states and groups of
different civilizations (1993, p. 22), and these intercivilizational conflicts will be more frequent
and violent than conflicts within the same civilization (1993, p. 48).
While Huntington predicted the clash of civilizations to take place in the post-Cold War
period and to occur predominantly between states and groups (non-state actors), prominent
extant quantitative evaluations do not extensively cover the contemporary era and test the
validity of the CoC thesis mainly from relationships between states. For instance, Russett, Oneal
and Cox (2000) undertook one of the most prominent assessments at the dawn of the 21st
century, but their test covered a period (1950-1992) that is almost entirely related to the Cold
War and sought to establish if states belonging to different civilizations were more likely to
engage in militarized disputes with each other than states belonging to the same civilization.
Russet, Oneal, and Cox (2000) did not find evidence linking civizational difference and
militarized interstate disputes.
In A Reply to Russett, Oneal & Cox, Huntington (2000) rebuffed the quantitative analysts’
claim that their assessment of militarized interstate disputes between 1950 and 1992 provided a
test of the clash thesis: “It does nothing of the kind, and the claim that it does is simply
untrue…an analysis of conflicts during the Cold War can neither prove nor disprove” the CoC
thesis (p. 609). Furthermore, Huntington criticized Russett, Oneal, and Cox’s (2000) test dataset
for covering “only interstate conflicts” which are “very few” in the post-Cold War period and are
largely outnumbered by conflicts between states on one side and (non-state) armed groups on the
other (p. 609). Huntington concluded his critique by calling on Russett, Oneal, and Cox to rerun
their assessment with a revised design focusing on the post-Cold War period and incorporating
conflicts involving non-state actors. In a separate article, Oneal and Russett (2000) reacted to
Huntington’s critique with a qualitative justification for the Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000)

interstate conflict—and Cold War era-related—test dataset but did not undertake Huntington’s
challenge for a revised, more comprehensive test of the CoC thesis.
Subsequent major large-n evaluations, including Henderson and Tucker (2001), Chiozza
(2002), and Imai (2006), generally echo Russett, Oneal, and Cox’s finding of no statistically
significant evidence for the CoC thesis, but critically fail to cover the post-Cold War period
extensively and continue to test for intercivilizational belligerence mainly from relationships
between states, possibly owing to a relative dearth of data on non-state actors. The resurgence of
suspected Islamist terrorism in the West on the eve of the 25th anniversary of Huntington’s CoC
article presents a timely opportunity to re-evaluate the clash thesis more closely on its own terms.
This article assesses the CoC thesis over almost the entire post-Cold War period (1989-2015)
whilst gauging intercivilizational belligerence (or the absence thereof) from all dyadic armed
conflicts, including extra systemic, interstate, intrastate, and internationalized intrastate conflicts,
in which at least one of the primary sides is a state.
Based on two measurements (one geographically bound and the other non-geographically
bound) of civilizational similarity within dyads, preliminary descriptive frequency statistics
herein reveal that the number of intercivilizational conflicts in 2015 was slightly higher than in
1989 while the number of intracivilizational conflicts in 2015 was relatively lower. While the
comparative frequency counts seem to suggest that intercivilizational conflicts have increased
over time in line with Huntington’s prediction, a closer observation of the entire period inbetween 1989 and 2015 reveals volatile surges and dips in the distribution of inter- and
intracivilizational conflicts across time.
Further analysis involving two logistic regression models controlling for some traditional
realist and liberal conflict influences do not find statistically significant evidence linking
civilizational difference and increased likelihood of armed conflict among states and between
states and groups or non-state actors, corroborating extant quantitative evidence against
Huntington’s clash thesis as a basis for foreign policies of cultural containment.
This article proceeds in three sections: first, counterfactual testable hypotheses are derived
from a brief review of Huntington’s reasons as to why civilizations are expected to clash; next, a
quantitative evaluative design is described; and finally, statistical outputs of the evaluation are
reported together with their policy implication.
Rethinking Huntington’s Thesis: Why Civilizations Will Not Clash
Huntington (1993; 1996) predicted that civilizations will clash in the post-Cold War
period remarkably as a function of various factors, notably including identity differences
between civilizations, increased interactions between civilizations resulting from globalization,
and resistance to “Westernization” of other civilizations. This section reviews these factors and
avers a counterfactual hypothesis to the clash thesis.
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Identity Differences
According to Huntington (1993), civilizations are expected to clash primarily because of
“differences among civilizations” with regard to ascriptive identifiers as language, tradition, and
religion (p. 25). These differences are “real,” “basic,” “fundamental,” and “have generated the
most prolonged and most violent conflicts” (p. 25). Huntington clearly makes a direct link
between cultural identity difference and conflict outbreak. However, such a primordialist linkage
is overly simplistic, treating hospitality and cooperation within the in-group and hostility and
conflict against the out-group as a mere function of “common blood” (Vanhanen, 1999) and
myths of own group virtuousness and superiority (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006, p. 926).
Huntington’s primordialist conception of cultural identity is trumped by the more convincing
instrumentalist perception that views the effect of cultural identity on conflict as indirect rather
than direct: intercultural conflicts arise only when identities are politicized or manipulated for
exclusionary political and socio-economic benefits. Thus, differences in the identities of
civilizations are unlikely to produce conflicts except in circumstances where the identities are
politicized (Gurr, 1994; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).
More critically, even if Huntington’s primordialist perception linking mere differences in
cultural identity and intercivilizational conflicts were to be accepted as correct, then one can
logically expect more clashes within, not between, civilizations because there are more levels of
identity differences within, than between, civilizations. As clarified in Huntington’s (1993) own
work, a civilization is the broadest level of cultural identity short of that which differentiates
humans from other species and there are only “seven or eight” civilizations in the world (p. 24).
Conversely, within each civilization, a group could culturally identify itself in several ways
according to its village, district, region, country, and continent of location or origin. Thus, if
cultural identity differences were actually a direct source of clashes as Huntington asserts, then
there should be more conflicts between entities within civilizations than between civilizations.
Increased Interactions
Globalization in the post-Cold War period, according to Huntington (1993), has stirred a
surge in interactions between peoples of different civilizations, intensifying “awareness of
differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations,” and engendering
conflicts between, and peace within, civilizations (p. 25). However, the asserted linkage between
globalization and intercivilizational conflicts is undermined by the empirically stronger
commercial peace theory, which anticipates that increased interactions and movements of
people, investments, capital, and goods accompanying globalization will reduce mistrust and
increase interdependency, ultimately mitigating conflicts between civilizations. Indeed, as
national economies become more globalized, and as major powers such as the U.S. and UK exit
regional institutions such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU
while seeking global partnerships, the world is more likely to see intercivilizational cooperation
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while disgruntlement within regional organizations and partnerships being “Brexited” are likely
to fuel intracivilizational conflicts.
Resistance to Westernization
Huntington’s (1993) thesis prominently argues that, following the end of the Cold War,
“efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values” will
engender resistance from other civilizations and spur clashes between “the West and the Rest,”
especially between the West and the Muslim world (p. 29). Huntington’s thesis perceives
Western liberal democracy to be particularly inimical to Islam because it challenges the
sovereignty of God and God’s law (the Shari’a) by projecting the electorate and the legislature as
sovereign sources of authority. However, the internationalization of Islamic economies is
accompanied by effective democratization of Islamic polities, with the recent “Arab Spring”
protests for democracy and the increase in the number of democracies in the Arab and entire
non-Western world since the end of the Cold War (Salih, 2001, p. 4) challenging the supposed
incompatibility of democracy and Islam. Even when the former Gaddafi regime of Libya
mounted repressive operations against the popular protests, some other Arab states partnered
with NATO members to intervene, with the stated aim of protecting civilians. Such a partnership
bears testament to shared values of democracy and liberalism between the West and the Muslim
world (Che, 2013).
Several suspected Islamist terror incidents in the West, including the ones mentioned
earlier, and America’s war on terror, together with President Trump’s anti-Muslim immigration
executive orders, have been cited as evidence of a clash of civilizations between the West and
the Muslim world (Cohen, 2015). The proposed evidence is not quite convincing, however, as
Islamic states hosting America’s “war on terror” and/or being targeted by President Trump’s
immigration-restrictive executive orders constitute only a minority of the Muslim world, as not
all Muslims, even in Islamic states targeted by the U.S., hold extremist Islamist views. Moreover,
suspected ISIS and Al-Qaeda attacks have in recent years targeted not only Western cities but
also cities in the Islamic world itself, including Baghdad, Tripoli, and Damascus, killing “fellow
Muslims” and bomb-blasting even mosques.
Counterfactual arguments against Huntington’s CoC thesis suggest the following counterhypothesis:
Armed conflicts in the contemporary post-Cold War era are more likely within
civilizations than would be predicted by geographical contiguity and other conventional
determinants of armed conflicts.
Research Design
To test the clash thesis, observations of armed conflicts are made annually for every
armed conflict dyad in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s dyadic dataset, version 1-2016
(Melander, Pettersson, & Themnér, 2016) over the active years of each dyad across the postCold War period 1989-2015. Comparative frequency counts of intercivilizational and
4

intracivilizational conflict dyad-years are executed via the Chi-square crosstabs procedure on the
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to find preliminary evidence for or against the
clash thesis. To further evaluate the influence of civilizational identity difference on dyadic
armed conflicts, this study uses logistic regression analysis controlling for traditional realist
(geographic contiguity, military capability, and military support) and liberal (level of democracy)
variables predicting armed conflict.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study (CONFLICT) is dichotomous and relates to the
presence or absence of a dyadic armed conflict involving a state on the one side and another state
or a non-state actor on the opposing side, and in which the use of armed force results in at least
twenty-five (25) battle-related deaths in a calendar year. This understanding of armed conflict
allows for a test of the clash thesis not only from interactions exclusively involving states as with
most extant evaluations, but also from relationships involving non-state actors. The twenty-five
(25) battle-related deaths threshold might imply an exclusion of several possible
intercivilizational militarized disputes involving threats, displays, and uses of military force that
do not result in twenty-five (25) deaths. However, it allows the clash thesis to be tested more
closely on Huntington’s own terms which forecast that, violent conflicts between “states and
groups of different civilizations” are likely to be severe and to escalate “as other states and
groups from these civilizations rally to the support of their ‘kin countries’” (Huntington, 1996,
p. 28; see also Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000, p. 591). Moreover, the relative scarcity of data on
militarized disputes merely involving threats and displays of military force for the period under
study, and for relationships involving non-state actors, makes it impossible to incorporate such
disputes in this study.
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) dyadic dataset uses the twenty-five (25)
battle-related deaths threshold and covers various types of armed conflicts (extra systemic,
interstate, intrastate, and internationalized intrastate conflicts) in which at least one of the dyadic
parties is a state. Thus, the UCDP dyadic dataset (version 1-2016) is used to code the dependent
variable for all active years of each dyad across the post-Cold War period under study. Herein,
the active interval of a conflict dyad starts from the year in which the dyad first recorded twentyfive (25) battle-related deaths and ends when it last recorded that threshold. Years outside the
active interval but falling within the 1989-2015 post-Cold War scope of study, are excluded from
the analysis. This is to ensure that the non-state actors included in the analysis were actually in
existence for the dyad-years coded, assuring accuracy of the analysis. To illustrate, Senegal vs.
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) with dyad ID 129 in the UCDP dyadic
dataset was seen within the post-Cold War period to be active only from 1990 to 2011. Thus
1989 and the post-2011 years are not coded for this dyad and are excluded from analysis. If a
dyad registered at least twenty-five (25) battle-related deaths in an active year, the dependent
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variable, CONFLICT, is coded ‘1’ to indicate the presence of armed conflict; if it did not, it is
coded ‘0’ to indicate an absence of armed conflict.
Independent Variable
Difference, or the absence thereof, in the civilization identities of the component entities of
the dyads in the UCDP dyadic dataset constitutes the predictor variable in this study. Civilization
identity difference is measured in two ways, with the second measure allowing the study to test
the robustness of empirical findings associated with the first measure. First, Huntington’s (1996,
pp. 45-48, Map 1.3) geographically bound conception and classification of major civilizations is
used to identify the civilization membership of states and non-state actors, allowing for an
evaluation of the clash thesis through Huntington’s own lenses. To minimize the possibility of
missing civilization identity data for states which do not fall under any of the civilizations
identified by Huntington (e.g., Israel and Jamaica), the Huntington-based measure of civilization
difference (CIVDIF) draws on Henderson and Tucker (2001) as a complementary data source.
Henderson and Tucker (2001, p. 325) list such states under a residual civilization category
known as “Other.”
Under the CIVDIF measure, the civilization identities of armed groups in extra systemic,
intrastate, and internationalized intrastate conflict dyads are generally considered in this study to
be the same as the identities of the countries within which they are located, given Huntington’s
geographically bound conception of civilizations. The UCDP Actor Dataset (version 2.2-2016)
compiled and updated by Pettersson (2014) is used to determine the country location of non-state
actors per conflict dyad in the UCDP dyadic dataset. CIVDIF is coded ‘1’ for all active dyadyears wherein the rival entities in the dyad belong to different civilizations, and ‘0’ where the
dyadic entities belong to the same civilization.
However, the CIVDIF measure, though ensuring that the clash thesis is tested as closely as
possible on Huntington’s own terms, predisposes most conflict dyads to being coded as
intracivilizational since a majority of post-Cold War conflicts are intrastate conflicts. More
critically, coding intrastate conflict dyads as intracivilizational dyads potentially disregards the
influence of core cultural identity disputes in some intrastate and internationalized intrastate
conflicts. Component entities of some intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflict dyads do
not perceive each other as sharing the same cultural identity, irrespective of Huntington’s
geographically bound conception and classification of civilizations.
Examples of intrastate conflict dyads coded under CIVDIF as intracivilizational but
characterized by perceived core cultural identity differences and disputes include: Algeria vs.
Islamic Salvation Army (UCDP Dyad ID 1); Algeria vs. Armed Islamic Group (ID 3); Egypt vs.
Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya (ID 241); Afghanistan vs. Taliban (ID 327); Afghanistan vs. Hezb-iIslami (ID 412); (Pakistan vs. Mohajir Quami Movement (ID 340); Iraq vs. Al-Mahdi Army (ID
442); Iraq vs. Ansar Al-Islam (ID 443); Iraq vs. IS (ID 448); Nigeria vs. Boko Haram (ID 793);
and Syria vs. IS (ID 14620). While all of the listed dyads are coded under CIVDIF as (Islamic)
6

intracivilizational dyads, the sub-state groups in the dyads actually perceive(d) and project(ed)
the governments of their dyadic adversaries as being “Western” and secular since those
governments usually align with and are supported by Western powers, particularly the USA. On
the other hand, the government sides in the listed dyads perceive(d) and project(ed) their dyadic
adversaries as extremists on diversity-intolerant “jihadist” missions.
Because some intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflict dyads might be
characterized by core cultural identity differences and disputes, regardless of Huntington’s
classification of civilizations, core cultural identity (CORECUL) is constructed as a second
measure of the independent variable to test the robustness of empirical findings associated with
the CIVDIF measure. Drawing mainly on Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s (2013) NonState Actors in Armed Conflict (NSA) Dataset, which provides detailed information and
narratives on civil and internationalized civil conflict dyads in the UCDP dyadic dataset,
CORECUL is coded ‘1’ if at least one dyadic side perceived and projected the other as being
culturally different, with cultural identity being a fault line in the dyad, and ‘0’ otherwise. This
coding operationalization is based on the “weak link” assumption, which asserts that the
belligerent character of dyadic interactions is often determined by the side with fewer constraints
(Oneal & Russett, 1997; also cited in Chiozza, 2002, p. 722). In this context, the less constrained
side is expected to be the one that projects itself as being culturally different (e.g., Islamic
Salvation Army in Algeria, Taliban in Afghanistan, Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq, and Boko Haram in
Nigeria) from the other dyadic side, with a motivation to militarily challenge the other side.
Control Variables
Three realism-based variables (geographical contiguity, national capacity, and third-party
military support) and one liberalism-based factor (level of democracy) that are among key
conventional determinants of armed conflict are added to the baseline regression models.
First, given that civilizations are geographically bound in Huntington’s conception and that
most conflicts are between contiguous actors, the empirical evaluation of the clash thesis controls
for geographical contiguity between the component entities of each dyad. Geographical
contiguity provides a potential for members of a dyad to reach each other with military force.
Moreover, contiguous actors are likely to have the most reasons to fight, including over
territorial control, natural resources, political power, secessionist and irredentist nationalism, and
so forth. Thus, geographical contiguity provides both the opportunity and incentives to fight. The
study draws mainly on the Correlates of War (COW) project’s territorial contiguity data
(Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, & Gochmanet, 2002) and on state–rebel conflict dyad narratives in
Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s (2013) NSA dataset to gauge geographical contiguity
(GEOCON). GEOCON is coded ‘1’ if both dyadic entities are directly contiguous, with one
being a component part of the other (as in most civil conflict dyads) or with both entities sharing
a land and/or sea border, and ‘0’ otherwise.
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Second, because the national material (including military) capacities of states to exercise
and resist pressure or influence in relations with other states and non-state actors may increase
incentives and opportunities for armed conflicts, this study controls for national capacities in all
post-Cold War conflict dyad-years. The COW project’s index of national material capabilities,
version 5.0 (Greig & Enterline, 2017)—which uses diverse (demographic, industrial, and
military) component indicators—is employed to gauge national capacity, NACAPH, with higher
values expected to correlate with greater armed conflict propensity. For dyads exclusively
composed of states (interstate dyads), the greater of the two states’ NACAPH values is used. This
is consistent with the aforementioned “weak link” assumption in conflict studies. In terms of the
reasoning linking national capacity and armed conflict, the state expected to be less constrained
is the state with a higher NACAPH value.
The third control variable reflects the realist expectation that, third party military support
to at least one side in a dyad is likely to boost motivation and opportunities for armed conflict,
irrespective of the civilizational character of the dyad. Third party military support is added to
the baseline regression models using the variable name MILSUP which equals ‘1’ if one or both
members of a dyad had military support from other states and/or non-state actors, and ‘0’ if
neither dyadic side had military support. Observations for the presence or absence of third-party
military support in the dyad were made from the UCDP dyadic dataset itself and Cunningham,
Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s (2009) Non-State Actor Data (version 3.4) which draws on the UCDP
to expand information on non-state actors involved in civil conflicts, including information about
external support to armed groups.
Under liberalism, democracy is seen to enjoy an almost unrivalled, though not undisputed,
peace-inducing effect arising from its institutional and cultural constraints on state leaders
(Russett, 1995). Accordingly, it is to be expected that, regardless of the civilizational identities of
their component entities, dyads with higher levels of democracy would be less prone to armed
conflicts than dyads with lower levels of democracy. This study uses Polity IV data, v.2015
(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016) to code level of democracy, DEMOCRACYL, in contemporary
conflict dyad-years. Based on three component indicators of the political character of regimes
(popular participation, openness of executive recruitment, and executive constraints), the
composite Polity index measures democracy on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (most
autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). Owing to the absence of data measuring democracy in nonstate actors, DEMOCRACYL scores for all dyad-years in this study are derived exclusively from
those of state members of every dyad. The democratic character of dyads exclusively composed
of states (interstate dyads) is measured by the lesser of the two states’ polity scores as the state
with the lower score constitutes the ‘weak link’ in the dyad, with fewer constraints on its foreign
policy.
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Statistical Outputs
Preliminary descriptive statistical analysis involving comparative frequency counts of
dyadic conflicts within and between civilizations via the Chi-square crosstabs procedure on
SPSS reveal evidence that contradicts Huntington’s clash thesis and supports the counterhypothesis stated earlier. As reported in Table 1, of all the dyad-years coded (N = 1765), 1378
were plagued by armed conflicts. The proportion of intracivilizational dyad-years that witnessed
armed conflicts (1283; that is, 93.1 percent of 1378) was considerably greater than the number of
intercivilizational dyad-years that experienced armed conflicts (95; 6.9 percent) using
Huntington’s geographically bound operationalization of civilization difference (CIVDIF). When
the independent variable was coded in terms of the presence or absence of core cultural
differences within dyads irrespective of geographical (non)contiguity (CORECUL), more
intercivilizational dyad-years were observed to have witnessed armed conflicts (828, that is, 60.1
percent of 1378), relative to intracivilizational ones (550; 39.9 percent), as reported in Table 2.

Table 1
Observed frequencies of UCDP dyadic conflicts within and between civilizations
(1989 – 2015), based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational difference
CONFLICT
0 Absence of
armed conflict
Count

0 Side A and Side B belong
to the same civilization

Total

1 Incidence of
armed conflict

348

1283

1631

% within CIVDIF

21.3%

78.7%

100.0%

% within CONFLICT

89.9%

93.1%

92.4%

% of Total

19.7%

72.7%

92.4%

39

95

134

% within CIVDIF

29.1%

70.9%

100.0%

% within CONFLICT

10.1%

6.9%

7.6%

2.2%

5.4%

7.6%

387

1378

1765

21.9%
100.0%
21.9%

78.1%
100.0%
78.1%

100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

CIVDIF
Count

1 Side A and Side B belong
to different civilizations

% of Total
Count
Total

% within CIVDIF
% within CONFLICT
% of Total
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Table 2
Observed frequencies of UCDP dyadic conflicts within and between civilizations
(1989 – 2015), based on the CORECUL measure of civilizational difference
CONFLICT

0 Absence of
armed conflict
Count

550

685

19.7%

80.3%

100.0%

34.9%

39.9%

38.8%

7.6%

31.2%

38.8%

252

828

1080

23.3%

76.7%

100.0%

65.1%

60.1%

61.2%

14.3%

46.9%

61.2%

387

1378

1765

% within CORECUL

21.9%

78.1%

100.0%

% within CONFLICT

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

21.9%

78.1%

100.0%

% of Total
Count
1 Presence of core cultural % within CORECUL
dispute between side A and
% within CONFLICT
side B
% of Total
Count

Total

1 Incidence of
armed conflict

135

0 absence of core cultural
dispute between side A and % within CORECUL
side B
% within CONFLICT
CORECUL

Total

% of Total

In terms of the distribution of intercivilizational conflicts over the post-Cold War period
studied, frequency counts based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational difference indicate that
there were two intercivilizational dyad-year armed conflicts in 1989 and by 2015 the number had
increased slightly to ten, while the number of intracivilizational conflicts dropped marginally
from 58 in 1989, to 50 in 2015 (see Table 3). Frequency counts based on the CORECUL measure
of civilizational difference reveal a similar pattern, with intercivilizational conflicts rising from
22 in 1989, to 46 in 2015, whereas intracivilizational conflicts dropped from 38 in 1989, to 14 in
2015 (see Table 3). While the comparative frequency counts of inter- and intracivilizational
conflicts for the start (1989) and end (2015) years of the period studied might appear to suggest
that intercivilizational conflicts have increased over time in line with Huntington’s prediction, a
closer observation of the entire period in-between 1989 and 2015 reveals volatility in the
distribution of inter- and intracivilizational conflicts as graphically illustrated with line charts
below Table 3.
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Table 3
Distribution of UCDP Dyadic Armed Conflicts over the Post-Cold War Period, 1989 – 2015
Dyad- Number of
Year

Number of

Number of

Number of

Intercivilizational Intracivilizational Intercivilizational Intracivilizational
Conflicts based

Conflicts based

Conflicts based

Conflicts based

on CIVDIF

on CIVDIF

on CORECUL

on CORECUL

Measure of

Measure of

Measure of

Measure of

Civilizational

Civilizational

Civilizational

Civilizational

Difference

Difference

Difference

Difference

1989

2

58

22

38

1990

2

63

30

35

1991

4

63

32

35

1992

5

56

35

26

1993

7

47

31

23

1994

4

54

37

21

1995

1

45

31

15

1996

3

47

29

21

1997

3

52

26

29

1998

4

48

23

29

1999

3

47

25

25

2000

2

49

28

23

2001

4

47

31

20

2002

3

42

25

20

2003

4

40

26

18

2004

3

42

28

17

2005

3

37

27

13

2006

3

44

31

16

2007

2

42

32

12

2008

4

44

33

15

2009

3

44

32

15

2010

1

39

27

13

2011

3

49

34

18

2012

5

37

33

9

2013

2

48

35

15
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Figure 1. Illustration of volatility in the distribution of UCDP armed conflicts from 1989 to
2015, based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational difference.

Figure 2. Illustration of volatility in the distribution of UCDP armed Conflicts from 1989 to
2015, based on the CORECUL measure of civilizational difference

As illustrated in Figure 1, observations based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational
difference indicate dips in the number of intercivilizational dyad-year conflicts over the periods
12

1993-1995, 1998-2000, 2003-2004, 2006-2007, 2008-2010, and 2012-2013. Rather than a steady
decrease in the number of intracivilizational dyad-year conflicts as anticipated by the clash
thesis, observations reveal surges over the periods 1989-1990, 1993-1994, 1995-1997, 19992000, 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2010-2011, and 2012-2015. Volatility in the numbers
of intercivilizational and intracivilizational conflicts become even more pronounced when the
CORECUL measure of civilizational difference is used (Figure 2).
Chi-square tests for independence or relatedness between civilization difference and
armed conflicts in Table 4 (based on the CIVDIF measure of civilizational difference) below
suggest a statistically significant relationship as the “continuity correction” value (3.92)
rectifying an overestimation of the Pearson Chi-square value for a 2 by 2 crosstabulation has a
significance level (0.048) that is approximately equal to the commonly-used alpha value for
statistical significance (0.05). Civilization difference appears to be negatively related to armed
conflict propensity, with dyads composed of entities belonging to different civilizations being
less likely to engage in armed conflicts than dyads composed of entities belonging to the same
civilization. However, using the CORECUL measure of civilizational difference, Chi-square tests
revealed no statistically significant relationship between civilizational difference and armed
conflict propensity, p > 0.05 (see Table 5), suggesting yet again lack of empirical support for
Huntington’s positive correlation between civilization difference and increased conflict
likelihood.

Table 4
Chi-square tests for relatedness between civilization difference and incidence of armed conflict,
based on the CIVDIF measure of civilization difference

Value

df

Asymp. Sig.

Exact Sig.

Exact Sig.

(2-sided)

(2-sided)

(1-sided)

.039

.026

4.365a

1

.037

Continuity Correctionb 3.923

1

.048

Likelihood Ratio

1

.043

Pearson Chi-square

4.099

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

4.362

1

.037

1765

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 29.38.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Table 5
Chi-square tests for relatedness between civilization difference and incidence of armed
conflict, based on the CORECUL measure of civilization difference
Value

df

Asymp. Sig.

Exact Sig.

Exact Sig.

(2-sided)

(2-sided)

(1-sided)

.077

.041

3.218a

1

.073

Continuity Correctionb 3.010

1

.083

Likelihood Ratio

1

.071

Pearson Chi-Square

3.250

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

3.216

1

.073

1765

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 150.20.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Nonetheless, simple bivariate statistics cannot be relied upon for conclusive remarks
regarding the effect of civilization difference on armed conflicts. Non-multivariate test models
controlling for potential realist and liberal conflict-mitigating factors are imperative. Thus, two
logistic regression models incorporating four control variables each (geographical contiguity,
national capacity, military support, and level of democracy) were used to verify the influence of
civilizational difference on armed conflict. The first logistic regression model (Model 1) adopted
Huntington’s geographically bound operationalization of civilizations (CIVDIF) to ensure a test
of the clash thesis on its own terms. The second model (Model 2) checked the robustness of
findings in Model 1 by adopting a non-geographically bound operationalization of civilizations
which measures civilizational similarity within a dyad, or the absence thereof, in terms of
whether at least one dyadic side perceives the other as sharing the same core cultural identity
(CORECUL).
As shown in Table 6, Model 1 was statistically significant, χ2 (5, N = 1765) = 80.403,
p < 0.05, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between dyad-years that experienced
armed conflicts and those that did not.
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Table 6
Omnibus Tests of Model 1 Coefficients
Chisquare

df

Sig.

80.403

5

.000

Step 1 Block 80.403

5

.000

Model 80.403

5

.000

Step

Table 7
Model 1 Logit Analysis Predicting UCDP Dyadic Armed Conflicts, 1989 – 2015
Variables

B

Wald

p

Odds Ratio

95% C.I. for Odds Ratio
Lower

CIVDIF
GEOCON
NACAPH
DEMOCRACYL
MILSUP
Constant

Upper

-.720

8.491

.004

.487

.300

.790

.396
8.687
-.001
20.308
.617

3.484
7.089
.010
.000
9.344

.062
.008
.921
.996
.002

1.485
5927.498
.999
660020751.955
1.853

.980
9.899
.977
.000

2.251
3549281.965
1.021
.

Table 7 reports the contribution of each variable in regression Model 1 towards
predicting armed conflicts among states and between states and non-state actors in the UCDP’s
dyadic dataset. Civilizational difference (CIVDIF) makes the largest unique contribution while
third party military support (MILSUP) makes the least unique contribution per the Wald test (see
column labelled Wald). Only the contributions of CIVDIF and national military capability
(NACAPH) are statistically significant, p < 0.05. Geographical contiguity (GEOCON) contributes
that barely misses the statistical significance level of 0.05.
Civilizational difference (CIVDIF) makes a significant contribution (p < 0.05), but in a
direction opposite to the one forecasted in the clash thesis. While Huntington’s clash thesis links
civilizational difference with increased likelihood of conflict, the coefficient for CIVDIF here is
negative (as reported in the column of B values), meaning entities of different civilizations are
less likely than entities of the same civilization, to fight each other, ceteris paribus. CIVDIF’s
odds ratio suggests that, intercivilizational dyads are approximately 0.5 times less likely to
engage in armed conflicts than intracivilizational dyads. The specified odds ratio is, however,
only a point estimate at the true value, based on the sample data. Nevertheless, one can be 95
percent confident that the actual value of the odds ratio for CIVDIF lies between 0.30 and 0.79,
quite a small range of values. This confidence interval does not contain the value 1, ruling out
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the possibility of the true odds ratio being 1 with equal armed conflict probability for both
intercivilizational and intracivilizational dyads.
The above finding in Model 1, that intercivilizational dyads are less prone to armed
conflicts than intracivilizational dyads, corroborates the negative correlations between
civilizational difference and international conflict in major extant quantitative assessments of the
clash thesis for the post-Cold War period by Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000), Henderson and
Tucker (2001), and Chiozza (2002). But as noted earlier, these studies test the civilizational
effect on conflict exclusively from relationships between states, and their post-Cold War scope is
limited. Nevertheless, upon adding relationships involving non-state actors to the evaluative
design whilst stretching the temporal scope of extant analysis to cover almost the entire postCold War period (1989-2015), this study finds evidence that, based on the Huntington’s
geographically bound operationalization of civilizations, intracivilizational dyads are more prone
to armed conflicts than intercivilizational dyads, holding other factors constant. The positive B
coefficients on the realist control variables (geographical contiguity, military support, and
national capability) and the negative coefficient on the liberal one (level of democracy)
corroborate the directional patterns of correlations between these variables and armed conflict in
extant peace research.

Table 8
Model 2 Logit Analysis Predicting UCDP Dyadic Armed Conflicts, 1989 – 2015
Variables
CORECUL
GEOCON
NACAPH
DEMOCRACYL
MILSUP
Constant

B

Wald

p

Odds Ratio

-.236
.639
7.389
-.002
20.174

3.306
10.391
5.210
.029
.000

.069
.001
.022
.864
.996

.790
1.894
1618.396
.998
577151264.646

.509

6.846

.009

1.663

95% C.I. for Odds Ratio
Lower
Upper
.612
1.019
1.284
2.793
2.841
922084.765
.976
1.020
.000
.

To test the robustness of the finding linking civilizational similarity and increased armed
conflict likelihood, another logistic regression analysis (Model 2) was executed whilst adopting a
non-geographically bound operationalization of civilizational identity. Model 2 gauges
civilization difference in terms of at least one member of the dyad perceiving and projecting the
other as having a different core cultural identity (CORECUL), irrespective of geographical
proximity. The robustness test model was statistically significant, χ2 (5, N = 1765) = 75.550,
p < 0.05.
However, as reported in Table 8 above, while the negative direction of correlation between
civilizational difference and armed conflicts in Model 2 (see CORECUL’s B coefficient) is the
same as in Model 1 and opposite to the one forecasted by Huntington, the unique effect of
CORECUL on the dependent variable marginally misses the level of statistical significance (p =
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0.069 > 0.05). The range of values for which one can be 95 percent confident encompasses the
actual value of the odds ratio for CORECUL (0.61 – 1.02) contains the value 1, meaning the true
odds ratio could well be 1, with intercivilizational dyads being equally prone to armed conflicts
as intracivilizational dyads. This does not corroborate the finding from Model 1, but it
nevertheless disconfirms Huntington’s CoC thesis predicting intercivilizational dyads to be
disproportionately prone to armed conflicts.
Conclusion
This study has substantially broadened and temporally extended the post-Cold War scope
of major extant large-n evaluations of Huntington’s clash of civilizations (CoC) thesis by
assessing the civilizational effect on conflictual interactions involving not only states but also
interactions between states and non-state actors, from 1989 to 2015. Rather than a steady
increase in intercivilizational and a steady decrease in intracivilizational armed conflicts,
descriptive statistical analysis revealed volatility in the year-to-year distribution of
intercivilizational and intracivilizational armed conflicts over the post-Cold War period. Two
logistic regression tests incorporating geographical contiguity, military support, national
capability, level of democracy was executed to gauge the effect of civilizational identity
difference on armed conflict propensity. Using a geographically bound operationalization of
civilizations, regression Model 1 found that, instead of increasing the likelihood of armed
conflict as predicted in Huntington’s clash thesis, civilization difference appears to reduce armed
conflict propensity. Regression Model 2 adopted a non-geographically bound operationalization
of civilizations but found that intercivilizational dyads could be equally prone to armed conflicts
as intracivilizational dyads, yet again disconfirming the clash thesis, albeit not statistically
significantly.
The presence and absence of statistical significance in logistic regression outputs linking
civilizational similarity and increased armed conflict propensity in Model 1 and Model 2
respectively suggest a possibility that the validity or falsity of Huntington’s clash thesis could
well vary depending on how conflict dyads are coded to be intercivilizational or not. But the
absence of statistically significant evidence for a positive correlation between civilizational
difference and armed conflict proclivity in both regression models in this study affirms extant
quantitative evidence against the clash thesis (Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000; Henderson &
Tucker, 2001; and Chiozza, 2002).
Critically, however, the UCDP dyadic dataset on which the clash thesis is tested does not
incorporate dyads composed exclusively of non-state armed groups. Thus, although this study’s
findings disconfirm the CoC thesis, they do not necessarily deny that civilizational or cultural
factors, including ethnic and religious differences, might be at play in politics and conflicts
involving non-state groups exclusively. Further assessments focusing on non-state actors and
incorporating more realist and liberal control variables are required to provide more conclusive
evidence regarding the civilizational effect on politics and conflicts in general. Nevertheless, to
17

the extent that Huntington’s thesis predicts armed clashes among states, and between states on
the one hand and non-state armed groups on the other, it does not find empirical support in this
study to justify it as a basis for states to adopt foreign policies of civilizational containment,
involving, but not limited to, restrictions or absolute bans on immigration and refugee flows from
other civilizations.
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